Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex
Marriage? by Poirier, Marc R.
FIU Law Review 
Volume 3 Number 2 Article 6 
Spring 2008 
Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage? 
Marc R. Poirier 
Seton Hall University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Other Law Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Marc R. Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FIU L. Rev. 307 (2008). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol3/iss2/6 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
FIU Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
307 
Gender, Place, Discursive Space:  Where is Same-Sex 
Marriage? 
Marc R. Poirier 1 
INTRODUCTION 
At the opening dinner for LatCrit XII, the speakers discussed the local 
racial geopolitics of Miami—Cubans, Haitians, Jews, other Latino groups, 
white southern Protestants.  Meanwhile, a dinner companion passed me a 
note that asked, “Is race public or private?”  I wrote back, “It’s both.  Race 
is performed, for self and others.”  He wrote back, “I thought you’d say 
that.” 
My scholarship increasingly focuses on another part of our constella-
tion of identities: gender, including GLBT identity, especially in its perfor-
mative aspects.  It specifically considers how performances of transgressive 
or stigmatized identity around sex and gender have the potential to trans-
form, at one and the same time, (1) an individual’s sense of identity around 
sex and gender, (2) the character of specific spaces and places, (3) social 
norms of identity around sex and gender, and (4) the legal rules in specific 
jurisdictions.  I will summarize some past efforts here, sketch a couple of 
current projects, and raise some questions.  I take seriously the symposium 
organizers’ admonition that this piece is to reflect the LatCrit conference 
presentation and that it need not offer the intense footnote apparatus cus-
tomary in law review scholarship. 
This essay addresses gender as performance (Part I); the concepts of 
place and discursive space, especially as concerns the visibility of GLBT 
individuals and  issues (Part II); and some of the ways one could address 
the question “Where is same-sex marriage?” in light of the preceding dis-
cussions (Part III).  Part IV offers some concluding thoughts on the useful-
ness of the method demonstrated in this essay, that is, asking the 
place/space question when considering contested and stigmatized identities. 
                                                    
 1 Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  Versions of the paper were also pre-
sented at a Seton Hall Law School Faculty Colloquium and at a New York Area LGTB Writers Work-
shop.  Thanks to Martin Bruner for a helpful conversation about the thesis and structure of these com-
ments and to Michael Poreda for reviewing the draft.  Thanks to research assistants John Devendorf, 
Michelle Ghali, and Michael Poreda for all of their research assistance.  
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I. GENDER 
My previous work in the area of gender has considered everyday 
mechanisms of the creation and maintenance of gender roles and gender-
tagged social categories generally; the emergence of public discussions 
about masculinity vis-à-vis homosexuality, especially when the Boy Scouts 
of America are concerned; the importance of piecemeal normalizing per-
formances of various social roles by GLBT individuals and same-sex cou-
ples in preparing the way for the cause of marriage equality; and the poten-
tial for transgressive performances of gender roles to shift social and cul-
tural norms around gender, including norms around marriage.  I will sum-
marize some of this work here. 
In a symposium article a few years back about cognitive theory, gen-
der, and gender-tagged social roles (occupations, family, politics), I stressed 
that gender stereotypes are grounded in the visible repetition of microper-
formances of gendered social roles.2  Stereotypical gender roles exist at the 
level of individual human bodies and consciousnesses. They are perceived, 
stored in cognitive categories, and replicated in daily performances, itera-
tively, much in the way a language is.3  Normally, this iterated and diffuse 
reproduction results in a kind of homeostasis that preserves the already-
established norms and stereotypes.  However, I suggested that by shifting 
both the gender of examples encountered in the real world and the gender 
of media images of persons in various social roles, it might be possible to 
undermine the cultural and cognitive reproduction of unconscious gender 
stereotypes, and change the contents of our categories bit by bit.4   A small 
section of a subsequent article on cognitive bias reiterated this theme of the 
role of visibility of workplace performances of gendered occupational roles 
in creating and maintaining gender stereotypes, arguing that the owners of 
                                                    
 
2
 Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1076, 1093-1116 
(1999).  This article was developed as part of a symposium panel on VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (1998) and in particular develops Dr. Valian’s discussion of gender 
schemas. 
 
3
 Poirier, supra note 2, at 1108-10; cf. Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721, 
805-09 (1996) (discussing the diffuse replication of gender roles).    
 
4
 The “content of our categories” refers to a leading law review article in the field of cognitive 
bias and law, Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).  I explored briefly 
the hypothetical example of a community where most of the bus drivers are female.  Children in such a 
community might well not acquire an unconscious gender-tag for the occupation bus driver, or might 
acquire a female gender-tag for the occupation bus driver.  On the other hand, if the images available in 
the media continue to be of male bus drivers, it is not so certain whether and how the occupation will be 
tagged for gender.  Poirier, supra note 2, at 1097-98.  The potential for changing unconscious stereo-
types by changing images is discussed id. at 1120-21. 
2008] Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage? 309 
workplaces should be held responsible in some measure to control the sites 
of reproduction of disadvantageous gender stereotypes.5  
In an article about another arena of specifically male gender perform-
ance, I considered the politics of American masculinity and the Boy Scouts 
of America’s ban on openly gay adult members.6 Although the Supreme 
Court upheld this ban as a matter of freedom of expressive association in 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,7 the article takes a curiously positive view 
of the case.  The controversy forced the Boy Scouts’ anti-gay policy out 
into the open.  And because of the pervasive and culturally important nature 
of the Boy Scouts in the United States, the controversy forced a debate on 
youth education, masculinity, and homosexuality, including the stigmatiza-
tion of “sissies” and the heteronorming of male gender role models, into 
many local corners of American society that frankly would probably have 
preferred not to have to go there.8  The Boy Scouts/gay-exclusion contro-
versy made the social construction of masculinity in this context much 
more apparent to those who cared to notice.  I argued moreover that the 
many sites of local contest generated by the Boy Scouts’ gay-exclusion 
controversy were places where social change around masculinity could 
begin, once the de-essentialization of masculinity had occurred.9 “Indeed, 
because gender is performed, produced, and reproduced in individual inter-
actions, the local and personal level is where change must ultimately occur, 
if a change mandated via larger normative structures within our society, 
such as statutory or case law, is to take hold.”10  
The investigation of local and personal interaction around gender per-
formance and its relationship to facilitating cultural changes at the legal 
level was continued in an article published early in 200711 on the occasion 
of Lewis v. Harris,12 the New Jersey marriage equality decision.  Lewis v. 
Harris required the state to provide rights and benefits to same-sex couples 
equal to those available to married couples, but allowed the legislature to 
decide whether to permit same-sex marriage or instead create an alternate 
legal structure for same couples. The first part of that article, relying on 
decades of historical and legal scholarship by others about the emergence of 
gay and lesbian movements and legal claims, demonstrated that a standard, 
                                                    
 
5
 Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 491-94 (2003). 
 
6
 Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of 
American Masculinity, 12 LAW & SEX. 271 (2003). 
 
7
 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 
8
 Poirier, supra note 6, at 275-76. 
 
9
 Id. at 275. 
 
10
 Id. 
 
11
 Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage Equality in New 
Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris a Dead End or Just a Detour?, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 291 (2007). 
 
12
 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
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well-accepted trajectory for GLBT folk also occurred in New Jersey, from 
stigmatized to tolerated to recognized as valuable participants in society – 
in other words, the gradual emergence of GLBT folk into visibility without 
shame, first as individuals and then as couples and parents.13  Eventually a 
claim of a right to legal recognition as couples—the type of claim only par-
tially successful in Lewis v. Harris—could be plausibly advanced. I summa-
rized: 
The basic engine of the piecemeal approach to wholesale recognition 
[of same-sex marriage] is an ever-increasing visibility of GLBT folks 
as normal, functional, decent human beings, capable of having nor-
mal, functional, decent familial relationships. It allows many people 
(both in the general population and in the legislature and judiciary) 
who may have been unfamiliar with GLBT folks to “get used to it,” in 
the words of a well known queer slogan. “Getting used to it” takes the 
form of looking at a particular same-sex couple or same-sex parent-
child relationship in a particular context and saying, “Well, that looks 
pretty healthy and normal, all things considered,” over and over again. 
Essentially, it involves GLBT folks’ socially visible performances as 
couples and parents, which gradually normalize their cultural status as 
acceptable couples and parents . . . .14 
As Carlos Ball recently argued, “in many ways, overcoming invisibility is 
the first step in successfully demanding basic civil rights.”15  And with re-
gard to same-sex marriage, once visibility becomes possible, then, as An-
drew Koppelman argues, performances of same-sex couples as normal cou-
ples and parents can potentially persuade people that GLBT folk are equals 
and deserve equal treatment legally.16   
Lastly, in a recent article seeking to understand the same-sex marriage 
controversy better from the traditionalist point of view,17 I argued, inter 
alia, that same-sex couples transgress traditionalist cultural norms in their 
daily microperformances as couples and parents.  Thus, the injury attributed 
to same-sex marriage, from the traditionalist viewpoint, is not only the dilu-
tion, desecration, tarnishment, and pollution of the traditional ritual and 
legal status of marriage in the general and abstract, but also the imposition 
on traditionalists in their daily lives of a myriad of visible, transgressive 
                                                    
 
13
 Poirier, supra note 11.   
 
14
 Id. at 344. 
 
15
 Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same Sex Marriage:  Learning from Brown v. Board 
and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1493, 1534 (2006). 
 
16
 Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same Sex Marriage, 2 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 5, 11 (2004) (noting the persuasiveness of performances of same-sex couples and parents 
as the equivalent of their heterosexual counterparts). 
 
17
 Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim within the Same Sex Marriage Controversy, 17 
COLUM. J. GENDER & LAW 343 (2008). 
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microperformances of same-sex couples as married couples.  Relying prin-
cipally on Mary Anne Case,18 Marc Fajer,19 and Mae Kuykendall,20 as well 
as on an analysis of the problematic lesbian marriage in Shahar v. Bowers,21 
I argue that same-sex couples are troubling for traditionalists in part be-
cause their daily visible performances as couples fail to follow the tradi-
tional, heteronormative structures and strictures of sexuality, gender, and 
family.  These inhere in traditional marriage and traditionalists view them 
as central to the reproduction of fundamental social structures and identities 
from one generation to the next.   
II. VISIBILITY, PLACE, AND DISCURSIVE SPACE 
Gender, understood in this way, inevitably implicates local iterated 
performances. For this reason, a vital part of the Kulturkampf over same-
sex marriage, and over gender and sexuality more generally, is the control 
of visibility.  GLBT equality is achieved in significant measure through 
transgressive visibility.  Those who wish to impede GLBT equality do so in 
part through limiting GLBT visibility.  GLBT performances of identity oc-
cur in physical places and also in what I will call discursive spaces.  Physi-
cal places require little explanation.  We could think of a “discursive space” 
as a realm where interpersonal contact and expression can occur and be 
expressed, whether in physical places or facilitated by speech or any of a 
number of media.  Physical place and discursive space often overlap, but 
they are not the same thing. 
  Here is an example. Madhavi Sunder’s perceptive analysis of the 
conflict around a gay and lesbian group’s attempted participation, under an 
explicit banner, in the Boston St. Patrick’s Day Parade22 describes the con-
flict as about “access to discursive space.”23  Sunder distinguishes an earlier 
era of civil rights which demanded access to physical space from a new 
                                                    
 
18
 See generally Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the 
Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643 (1993). 
 
19
 See generally Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.  511 (1992). 
 
20
 See generally Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story about Language: 
Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  385 (1999). 
 
21
 Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (6-5 decision upholding Georgia 
Attorney General’s rescission of offer of employment as an attorney to a law student who engaged in a 
same-sex wedding in the Jewish Reconstructionist faith and thereafter held herself out as married in her 
faith).  See Part III.D. infra for further discussion of this case. 
 
22
 This conflict is the subject of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of 
Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (application of state public accommodation law that would alter the ex-
pressive content of a parade by requiring visible inclusion of a gay and lesbian group violated the parade 
organizers’ First Amendment rights). 
 
23
 Madhavi Sunder, Note, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual Prop-
ertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 143, 144 (1995). 
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demand for access to cultural space in order to create and contest social 
meaning.24  I would not move so quickly to dismiss the dimension of access 
to physical space, as part of the demand for cultural space. Indeed, a recent 
formulation by Sunder is broader.  Both physical and cultural space are rec-
ognized as important dimensions of struggle.25   
Traditionalist groups well understand that they need to exercise control 
over the visibility of transgressive performances in the places and spaces 
that they control. Familiar examples include the military’s gay-exclusion 
policy, currently articulated as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”; the Boy Scouts 
gay-exclusion policy; and the American Catholic Bishops’ articulation of a 
semi-closeted role for GLB folk within the Catholic fold.26  From the oppo-
site viewpoint, consider what a number of American law schools attempted 
to do in their unsuccessful lawsuit in Rumsfeld v. FAIR,27 seeking to bar 
physical access to law schools on the basis of rights of expressive associa-
tion and free speech, in connection with the law schools’ antidiscrimination 
policies.28  Madhavi Sunder has a word for it.  Institutions can occupy 
physical places and those places can become contested because they pro-
                                                    
 
24
 “Today, civil rights movements’ priorities have shifted from obtaining access to physical space 
to seeking access to discursive space. A new struggle for inclusion by groups such as gays and lesbians 
centers on issues of identity, voice, culture, and ultimately the power to create and contest social mean-
ing.” Id. at 145 (footnote omitted). 
 
25
 Sunder wrote recently, “The freedom and equality battles of this new century will not only be 
about access to physical space, but also to discursive space. The crucial question will be: who will have 
power to make our cultural world?”  Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 247, 321 (2006). 
 
26
 Poirier, supra note 11, at 343-44 (discussing the military’s ban on openly gay and lesbian 
personnel; the Boy Scouts’ exclusion of gay scoutmasters; and the Catholic church’s recent pronounce-
ments, in a 2006 statement, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ministry to Persons with  a 
Homosexual Inclination: Guidelines for Pastoral Care (November, 2006), available at  
http://www.nccbuscc.org/dpp/Ministry.pdf). For thoughtful explorations of the mechanisms and extent 
of the silencing and invisibility imposed on GLBT service personnel by the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy, see, for example, Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability under 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1633 (2004); Kenji Yoshino, The Assimilationist Bias in Equal 
Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 538-
57 (1998).  
 
27
 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 
28
 With the polarities reversed, Georgetown University, both as an academic institution and as a 
religious one, was motivated by the same concerns in a case involving whether recognition and support 
of two gay and lesbian student groups would violate the institution’s constitutional rights. Compare Gay 
Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 20-39  
(D.C. Ct. App. 1987) (en banc) (plurality opinion by Mack, J.) (distinguishing endorsement from provi-
sion of tangible benefits, interpreting the District of Columbia Human Rights Act to require provision of 
tangible benefits but not of endorsement, and finding that precisely because the Act does not require 
endorsement, it is not an impermissible burden on the university’s free exercise of religion to require 
provision of tangible benefits) with id. at 62, 68-74 (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that forcing the university to subsidize speech with which it disagrees by providing tangible 
benefits to the group violates its First Amendment rights, quite apart from the issue of endorsement).  
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vide, in Sunder’s term, “discursive spaces.”29  Cultural conflict over indi-
vidual identity and shared cultural meanings and values occurs in specific 
places, over specific discursive spaces.  
“Place” is sometimes used in the law when what is really at issue 
might be better described as discursive space.  For example, New Jersey’s 
Law Against Discrimination (LAD) prohibits discrimination in a “place of 
public accommodation,” and identifies a number of protected identity cate-
gories.30  As to what constitutes a “place,” the statute provides a long, non-
exclusive list.31  In a 1974 case, the Little League tried unsuccessfully to 
defend against a lawsuit challenging its exclusion of girls from youth base-
ball, on the basis that the Little League did not operate from any fixed par-
cel of real estate which it owned and operated.32  It argued that there simply 
was no “place” of public accommodation so as to trigger the public ac-
commodation law.  The appellate court rejected this argument, pointing out 
that the Little League’s activities occurred on various ball fields, even if not 
ones owned by the Little League.33  The Little League was moreover held to 
be a “public accommodation” because the invitation was open to all (boy) 
children.34  I would describe what the opinion is getting at as the way in 
which public gatherings (which must occur in a physical place, after all) 
constitute discursive spaces in which community is expressed and recre-
ated.35  Although there must be places for those gatherings, the issue is ad-
mission to/exclusion from those spaces and to the organizations that con-
struct them.   
The same “place of public accommodation” issue was argued to the 
New Jersey courts in the Boy Scouts gay-exclusion controversy.36 The Boy 
Scouts claimed that the LAD did not apply to their organization as they 
owned no “place” and could not therefore be deemed a “place of public 
accommodation.”37  The New Jersey Supreme Court “decline[d]…to con-
strue ‘place’ so as to include only membership associations that are con-
nected to a particular geographic location or facility.”38  The court then held 
                                                    
 
29
 I am not especially satisfied with the term, frankly.   I find “discursive space” used in a variety 
of contexts, some of them seemingly quite vapid.   Nevertheless, I have not found any other usage to be 
consistent across disciplines, either. For now I will stick with “discursive space.” 
 
30
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (2002). 
 
31
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (2002). 
 
32
 Nat’l Org. for Women, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, 318 A.2d 33, 37 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1974). 
 
33
 Id. at 37. 
 
34
 Id. at 37-38. 
 
35
 To be sure, access to a common place or space may also be about access to tangible benefits. 
Herein of separate but equal, a topic well beyond the scope of this essay. 
 
36
 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).   
 
37
 Id. at 1208-10 (N.J. 1999). 
 
38
 Id. at 1210. 
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that the Boy Scouts was, in addition to a place, a public accommodation.39 
Therefore, unless a statutory exception or constitutional prohibition applied, 
the LAD barred the Boy Scouts from excluding Mr. Dale for being an 
avowed homosexual.   
In its discussion of the first principal factor addressing public accom-
modation status—whether the entity engages in broad public solicitation—
the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote a passage that is especially resonant 
with the themes of local and personal public performance of identity: 
Boy Scout troops also take part in perhaps the most powerful invita-
tion of all, albeit an implied one: the symbolic invitation extended by 
a Boy Scout each time he wears his uniform in public…. A boy in a 
uniform may well be Boy Scouts' strongest recruiting tool. By encour-
aging scouts to wear their uniforms to school, and when participating 
in “School Nights” and public demonstrations, Boy Scouts invites the 
curiosity and awareness of others in the community. Boy Scouts ad-
mits that it encourages these displays in the hope of attracting new 
members.40 
The Boy Scout uniform is understood to constitute an advertisement for the 
organization, as well as functioning as clothing.  Through the bodies of its 
child members, dressed to signal their membership, the Boy Scouts extends 
advertisement for the organization into specific locations that make up pub-
lic spheres. According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, this is a major 
part of what makes the organization public. 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court could not reverse the 
state supreme court’s interpretation of the LAD, a matter of state law.41  It 
went out of its way to comment on New Jersey’s extremely broad reading 
of place of public accommodation, and pointed out that several other courts 
had ruled that the Boy Scouts were not a place of public accommodation.42  
New Jersey’s position was unique.  
The Boy Scouts case offers the opportunity for some other important 
reflections on place and discursive space in conflicts around identity involv-
ing sex and gender.  James Dale, the plaintiff, tried unsuccessfully to man-
age a separation of different discursive spaces in which his identity was at 
issue.  He came out as gay while an undergraduate at Rutgers, became co-
president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance, and appeared in 
a photograph in an interview in a statewide newspaper, the (Newark) Star-
                                                    
 
39
 Id. at 1210-13.  The test applied asked “whether the entity . . . engages in broad public solicita-
tion, whether it maintains close relationships with the government or other public accommodations, or 
whether it is similar to enumerated or other previously recognized public accommodations.”  Id. at 1210. 
 
40
 Id. at 1211. 
 
41
 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 
42
 Id. at 657. 
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Ledger.43  Yet, he never ever identified himself as gay while in any physical 
place or space controlled by the Boy Scouts.44  In contrast to the GLIB 
group in Hurley, Dale did not seek to proclaim his gay identity within the 
physical places and discursive space of the Boy Scouts organization.45  
Nevertheless, having become visible somewhere in the broad public sphere 
as a gay man, he was not permitted thereafter to avoid the consequences of 
the Boy Scouts’ concern by continuing his practice of concealing his gay 
identity within the confines of the Boy Scouts places and spaces.  He was 
not permitted to rely on a separation of discursive spaces.  
The rhetoric in the United States Supreme Court’s discussion on this 
point is telling.46  Although in one sense the issue was Dale’s membership in 
the Boy Scouts, the Court repeatedly discusses the issue in terms of Dale’s 
“presence” in the organization, using the image of communicative “pres-
ence” of the body no less than four times.47  This may be partly due to the 
precedential pull of the facts in Hurley, where the GLIB organization really 
did intend its physical presence, with an identifying banner, in a public pa-
rade, to communicate something.48  The particularly strong valence of 
physical presence as communication is evident in the last of the uses of 
“presence” in Dale.49  In response to the argument that the Boy Scouts was 
inconsistent in allowing heterosexual adults who disagreed with the gay-
exclusion policy to remain within the organization, while excluding Dale, 
the Court writes:  
The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an 
assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message 
from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on 
record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy. The Boy Scouts has a 
First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not the 
other.50 
                                                    
 
43
 Dale, 734 A.2d. at 1204-05;  Dale, 530 U.S. at 644-45. 
 
44
 Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205-05, 1225, 1229; Dale, 530 U.S. at 689-90 (Stevens., J., dissenting). 
 
45
 Dale, 734 A.2d at 1225, 1229. 
 
46
 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653-56. 
 
47
 The first three of these are as follows. “We must then determine whether Dale’s presence as an 
assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts’ desire to not ‘promote homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior . . . .’” Id. at 653.  “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at 
the very least, force the organization to send a message . . . .”  Id. “[T]he presence of Dale as an assistant 
scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to propound a point of view 
contrary to its beliefs.” Id. at 654.  Justice Stevens’ dissent is also quite clear that the majority’s opinion 
rests on communicative presence, not on the possibility that Dale might become an open advocate of 
gay causes at those times and places where he is being a Boy Scout.  Id. at  689–93 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). 
 
48
 The dissent distinguishes Hurley’s physical inclusion in parade issue from Dale’s inclusion in 
membership issue.  Id. at 693-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
49
 Id. at 655-56 (majority opinion). 
 
50
 Id.  
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First, we might note the reappearance of the Boy Scout uniform theme. 
The Court clearly understands that the uniform conveys a message that is 
about personal identity and affiliation with the organization at the same 
time.  But, because Dale is an “avowed homosexual,” his own body is al-
ready marked.51  It conveys a message by its very “presence” within the 
Boy Scouts space. This message is at odds with the message represented by 
the uniform Dale wears.   
Second, the Court distinguishes between the verbal message of a het-
erosexual dissenter who is an adult member of the Boy Scouts and the 
physical message of the presence of an avowed homosexual.  The quoted 
passage recognizes that two different types of communication are occur-
ring.  One is about ideas and is verbal, and the other is about identity and is 
communicated by physical presence.  What is more, the Court gives the 
Boy Scouts the upper hand by allowing it to choose which messages to al-
low its members to send out (the verbal ones, not the physical presence 
ones) and what degree of dissent to tolerate.  
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court’s disagreement with the New Jersey 
Supreme Court is rooted precisely in a disagreement over whether the mere 
presence of Mr. Dale interferes with the Boy Scouts’ message.52  It is only 
because the Supreme Court has determined that the forced inclusion of Mr. 
Dale via the public accommodations law runs afoul of the Boy Scouts’ de-
sired message that the Court reaches the First Amendment issue at all.53 
In some other respects, the Supreme Court’s approach to management 
of discursive space in Dale is important to mention, but does not require so 
much discussion.  The Court essentially defers to the Boy Scouts as to what 
the organization’s message is without dealing with the problem of very 
scanty historical evidence.  It also essentially defers to the management of 
the Boy Scouts as to what constitutes interference with its message.  And 
the Court refuses to investigate whether dissent and disagreement within the 
organization – for example, a troop-by-troop local option – has any place.54  
Ultimately, as Christopher Hargis points out about Dale:  
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 Justice Stevens in dissent is puzzled and troubled.  “The only apparent explanation for the 
majority’s holding, then, is that homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their 
presence alone—unlike any other individual’s—should be singled out for special First Amendment 
treatment. Under the majority’s reasoning, an openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label 
‘homosexual.’ That label, even though unseen, communicates a message that permits his exclusion 
wherever he goes. His openness is the sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism.” Id. at 696 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  See generally Christopher S. Hargis, Note, The Scarlet Letter “H”: The Brand 
Left after Dale, 11 LAW & SEX. 209, 224-40 (2002); Nancy J. Knauer, “Simply So Different”: The 
Uniquely Expressive Character of the Openly Gay Individual after Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 89 
KY. L.J. 997 (2000-2001). 
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 Dale, 530 U.S. at 654-56. 
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 Id. at 656. 
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 See generally Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001). 
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[T]he majority rests its decision on the right of a speaker to control his 
or her message, while the majority itself simultaneously takes away 
that control by sua sponte constructing and imposing expressive ele-
ments upon homosexual identity. Despite the rhetoric of a state’s in-
ability to “interfere with speech,” the Court is the player who runs ul-
timate interference.55 
Hargis argues that by framing homosexuality as having elements of both 
status and expression, the Court constructs the issue as a battle between the 
First Amendment rights of opposed groups, rather than as the exclusion of a 
historically stigmatized and statutorily protected group.56 Hargis contrasts 
the Court’s approach to discrimination based on race and gender and its 
approach to homosexuality.57  In contrast to its historic sympathy for groups 
“clamoring for equality on race or gender grounds,” the Court “shifts dra-
matically when homosexuals attempt to claim the same discursive space.”58   
III. WHERE IS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE? 
Because performance and visibility occur in specific places and 
spaces, we may want to ask, “Where is same-sex marriage? Where specifi-
cally in place and space?”   I sketch here some of the possibilities that this 
question evokes.  A taxonomy structures my responses.  One might ap-
proach the question in terms of territorial jurisdiction (at any level of scale); 
aterritorial nomos (again, at any level of scale); metonymy (substituting 
“Where’s the wedding?” for “Where’s the marriage?”); and microperfor-
mances of the status of being married.  
A.  The Territorial Jurisdiction Approach  
One answer to the question “Where is same-sex marriage?” is straight-
forward:  “Massachusetts, Connecticut, and until recently California.”  
Variant one of this answer includes states with marriage substitutes – cur-
rently, the all-but-in-name civil unions in Vermont, New Jersey, and New 
Hampshire and the all-but-in-name domestic partnerships in Oregon, Wash-
ington state and California (the prior domestic partnership statute survives 
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 Hargis, supra note 51, at 241. 
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 Id. at 240. 
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 With regards for example to racial matters, Rosa Parks’ black body located in the wrong part of 
the bus is every bit as much about expression as status, and in some ways is quite comparable to GLIB’s 
attempt to enter the St. Patrick’s Day parade or Dale’s attempt to remain “present” in the Boy Scouts.  
But it is debatable whether our understanding of the nature of identity as performance has changed and 
become more sophisticated since the 1950s or —more likely in my view —the explanation is that homo-
sexuality is simply a less favored category for constitutional protection and, therefore, a rhetoric justify-
ing exclusion in terms of compelled speech and expressive association is more likely to succeed.  So 
Hargis’ position may well be an overstatement. 
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 Id. at 237. 
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the definition in California, via November 2008’s Proposition 8, that only a 
marriage between a man and woman will be valid and recognized in Cali-
fornia).  Variant two adds the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South 
Africa, and Norway, all of which currently recognize same-sex marriage.  A 
third variant includes the numerous jurisdictions outside the United States 
that have some other legal form that provides significant legal recognition 
to same-sex couples but falls short of marriage or marriage equivalence.  
Much of Western Europe is in this category, and perhaps some other territo-
rial jurisdictions. 
The structuring principle behind this response is that in an age of terri-
torial jurisdictions, the where of marriage is about which jurisdictions rec-
ognize it and which do not.  Fair enough, but certainly not the whole story.59  
For one thing, one might ask why marriage in the United States is governed 
at the state level rather than another one.  Surely this is partly an accident of 
our history; we began as a much more loosely knit union of entities with 
more clearly separate sovereignty.60  In addition to the historical starting 
point, Anne Dailey argues that states provide an appropriate balance be-
tween localist and communitarian concerns and a desire for some degree of 
uniformity.61  
The state level is not the only possibility.  For one thing, this is a coun-
try of dual sovereignty, state and federal. Disagreement over the legal defi-
nition of marriage can prompt attempts to move the issue to a federal level.  
This has happened repeatedly in our history.  Ed Stein recently surveyed the 
various efforts to develop a federal constitutional approach to various as-
pects of marriage.62  With regard to same-sex marriage, we should note that 
the Federal Marriage Amendment, proposed in 2004,63 was specifically 
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 I explore some of the shortcomings of the territorial jurisdiction approach, especially when 
married to federalism, in Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the Kulturkampf: 
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 See Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1821 (1995).  But see, 
e.g., Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the 
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 Dailey, supra note 60, at 1876-77. 
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 Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution Re-
garding Marriage, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 611 (2004). 
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 There are actually several proposed versions of the contemporary Federal Marriage Amend-
ment.  See Stein, supra note 62, at 613 n. 1.  Stein leads his article off by quoting S.J. Res. 30, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 
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prompted by the reaction to Massachusetts’ decision to recognize same-sex 
marriage64 and to the wildcat marriages of early 2004, themselves prompted 
by the Massachusetts decision.65  The Federal Marriage Amendment would 
eliminate the possibility of same-sex marriage and, in some versions, would 
eliminate legal recognition of other structures similar to marriage.  We 
should also take note of the 1996 federal Defense of Marriage Act, which 
articulated a one man and one woman definition of marriage for all federal 
laws, without imposing the definition on matters related to state law.66  
Moving in terms of scale in the other direction, “Where is same-sex 
marriage?” might prompt us to consider that perhaps the scale of territorial 
jurisdiction for marriage is too large and that it could be local rather than 
state level.  Richard Schragger has made this argument.67  Or we could go 
further, severing marriage definitions from territorial jurisdiction altogether 
through disestablishment. Churches and other ethical and moral institutions 
and communities would then be free to define licit marriages as they see fit.  
Since, however, marriage is also the vehicle for structuring a large number 
of social benefits and responsibilities, the state would probably still have to 
recognize some kind of household unit for a variety of legal purposes.68  
As to territorial jurisdiction more generally, we could note the rele-
vance of various other Kulturkampf-related disputes that can be addressed 
at various levels of federal, state, and local jurisdiction.  At issue in Romer 
v. Evans,69 for example, was a state-level response to local pro-gay ordi-
nances in Denver, Boulder, and Aspen, Colorado.70  The traditionalist oppo-
sition organized at the statewide level and enacted a broad state constitu-
tional ban on any pro-gay legislation. Justice Scalia’s dissent is quite clear 
about this territorial jurisdiction/scale dimension of the controversy.  He 
argues that there is nothing constitutionally wrong with state level re-
sponses that disable municipal level responses; and, moreover, that there is 
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nothing wrong with federal level responses, even constitutional responses, 
that disable state level responses on moral grounds.71   
On the issue of scale of territorial jurisdiction and the Kulturkampf, 
one important post-Romer decision upholds a local initiative amendment 
reversing pro-gay gains at the city charter level.  It can be read to be consis-
tent with Romer precisely because the scale of the traditionalist political 
and legal response matches the scale of the pro-gay ordinances overturned 
by the charter amendment.72   
State territorial jurisdiction over marriage and the current variation 
among states in legal recognition of same-sex relationships force us to en-
gage questions of choice of law and conflicts of law.73  As Andrew Koppel-
man writes, “What makes the choice of law problem so difficult with re-
spect to marriage questions is that both territorial and personal considera-
tions are in play.”74 The traditional marriage-recognition rule is place-based: 
the place of celebration, lex loci celebrationis.  A public policy exception 
purportedly allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages valid 
where celebrated.75  Conflicts are created by legal recognition of a marriage 
in one state and presence, within the territory of a non-recognizing state, 
either of the couple or of one member of the couple or of some other inter-
est (children, property, a tort right) sufficient to trigger a conflict.  The con-
flict is created either by simultaneous whereness76 of the marriage in multi-
ple jurisdictions, or by physical movement of some sort from one jurisdic-
tion to another.  A same-sex couple legally recognized in one state might 
own property in another state. One or both might travel to another state, 
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temporarily, for a vacation or on work assignment, or permanently, chang-
ing domicile. Or when a couple splits up, one might move to a non-
recognizing state in the hopes of protecting her/himself from divorce pro-
ceedings if the non-recognizing state also refused to undertake divorce as a 
matter of law or equity.  Such a move could be undertaken to preserve 
property or to insulate a parent-child relationship from legal divorce.77  All 
of these possibilities are just beginning to be fought out in the courts with 
regard to same-sex marriage, though the legal academic community has 
been thinking and arguing about them since the Hawaii litigation of the 
early 1990s suggested that sooner or later these types of conflicts would 
arise.78 To be sure, other types of controversies over interstate recognition of 
marriage, around divorce and interracial marriage, will provide precedent 
and insight. 
Whatever the doctrinal moves and eventual resolutions of them, the 
problem is set up by a tension between an expectation that things within a 
territorial jurisdiction will stay put and therefore can be governed unprob-
lematically by that territorial jurisdiction’s law, and an expectation that a 
person’s identity and status (and with them kinship relationships and some 
kinds of property rights and tort rights) will move with the person stably 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Our basic intuition is that a person’s 
whereness perhaps ought to have different consequences from real estate’s 
whereness.  
The problem is illustrated in a brief discussion by Robert Ellickson, 
responding to a proposal that in some circumstances parties ought to be able 
to contract for the property rights scheme that will govern their property, 
notwithstanding the law of the territorial jurisdiction in which the property 
is located.79  Ellickson points out that many government policies are appro-
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priately linked to a territory of the legal jurisdiction “to enhance the quality 
of the within-state physical, social, and moral environment.”80  At the same 
time, Ellickson acknowledged, “[l]ocation matters far less in legal relation-
ships that are not land-based.”81  One example is a corporation, which in 
Ellickson’s view should not have to have its legal regime tied to each dif-
ferent jurisdiction in which it is physically present.82  But when explaining 
that a state should be able to resist “the importation of out-of-state law [be-
cause it] can interfere with a state’s efforts to create a distinctive moral cli-
mate,”83 Ellickson gives as one example the compelled recognition by an 
unwilling state of an out-of-state same-sex marriage and its associated 
property rights, which he characterized as potentially “a threat to moral 
values” in the eyes of some citizens.84  He calls this claim of recognition of 
a same-sex marriage—here per Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal based in 
contractual choice, rather than a choice of lex loci celebrationis—an “im-
portation of [an] out-of-state form[] of interpersonal status.”85  Is status im-
ported, like a thing?  Under what circumstances would we want to approach 
control over status as belonging to each jurisdiction through which a person 
moves physically, instead of belonging in some more stable fashion to the 
individual whose status and identity are at stake?  Moreover, we might 
wonder how the recognition of an out-of-state legal same-sex union affects 
a state’s “moral climate” and “moral environment.”86  Are concerns about 
“moral environment” even legitimate here, especially when balanced 
against countervailing policies and interests?  Should it make a difference 
whether the individual’s choice of status is expressed by contractual choice, 
choice of domicile, or voluntary but temporary mobility of the body into the 
territory of a jurisdiction?   
Synthesizing various choice of law approaches to the problem of 
same-sex relationships in different states, Koppelman recommends relying 
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principally on domicile, the one place where a couple makes their home.87  
The place-of-celebration rule must give way to a contrary strong state pol-
icy where a couple is domiciled not in the state of the place of celebration, 
but in another state that is opposed to legal recognition of same-sex mar-
riage, and where the couple simply goes to a more friendly state long 
enough to celebrate the marriage.  At the same time, a spouse’s or couple’s 
merely transitory presence in a non-recognizing state should not invalidate 
an otherwise valid same-sex marriage.88  Koppelman’s recommendation 
fine-tunes the effect of a couple’s mobility and of the lex loci celebrationis 
rule, relying for its touchstone on the human commitment to live in one 
predictable place that constitutes domicile.  In fact, I suspect that it helps 
the persuasiveness of his argument that we can imagine a house (“domicile” 
is related to the Latin word for house, domus) belonging to the couple, a 
house physically located in the territory whose law governs the couple’s 
status—even if they have no house.  
One consequence of relying on domicile, a relatively stable category 
and one with ubiety, is to permit individuals and couples, through their 
choice of domicile, cumulatively to constitute particular place-based com-
munities with particular approaches towards same-sex marriage, as well as 
other parts of the Kulturkampf.  The relative permanence of domicile pre-
vents the undermining of community-building consequences of these loca-
tional choices by particular couples’ temporary mobility to a different locus 
celebrationis.   
At the same time, Koppelman’s proposal permits the interstate mobil-
ity of persons and interests necessary to function in contemporary society, 
without undermining the status chosen by the couple through their loca-
tional choice of a single, place-based domicile. Some scholars even discern 
here a constitutional implication of the right to travel if one makes such an 
important interest vulnerable when an individual travels from one state to 
another.89   
 The fact of mobility between territorial jurisdictions suggests another 
possible element to the analysis of recognition of same-sex marriage state-
by-state.  When one views the provision of same-sex marriage or a similar 
status as a local public good, a story about jurisdictional competition over 
local public goods first articulated by Charles Tiebout90 comes into focus. 
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Tiebout’s analysis has occasionally been invoked to justify jurisdictional 
variation as to the recognition of same-sex marriage, supplying a theoretical 
justification for a federalism argument around same-sex marriage.91  One 
problem with Tiebout-type solutions has to do with the costs of exit, which 
can limit mobility.92  This may occur, for example, when the scale of the 
local jurisdictions is large, as it is in the state-by-state patchwork of same-
sex marriage laws.  Reducing the scale to the local level might reduce this 
cost of exit.93  So might eliminating the scale altogether by disestablishing 
marriage and making its provision aterritorial and nullibietous.94   
B.  The Aterritorial Nomos Approach  
The term “nomos” comes from the reflection by Robert Cover on the 
accommodation of different religious and moral communities within the 
American polity, in what we might call nowadays an article on cultural and 
moral pluralism.95  Reflecting on freedom of religion cases involving sepa-
rate communities such as the Amish, Cover posited a framework for under-
standing that within the American multicultural framework we could ac-
count for communities whose members maintained a separate sense of iden-
tity and morality, in part through their shared stories.  Cover does not espe-
cially dwell on the geographic whereness elements of such communities, 
though a moment’s reflection will show that in the more separatist of them, 
there is indeed a mechanism of living physically apart and in proximity to 
liked-minded others.  That once again suggests the relevance of my obser-
vation, found in the earliest paragraph of this essay, on the way in which 
identity is formed, maintained, and reproduced in daily microperformances 
for self and others in local communities. 
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Jay Michaelson has suggested that those seeking a multicultural dia-
logue around the contemporary Kulturkampf might profitably turn to 
Cover,96 and so I shall briefly, here. The idea of a nomic community is actu-
ally extraordinarily familiar.  All one needs to do is set aside for a moment 
the concern about who or what has jurisdiction over the legal significance 
of marriage and ask instead who or what controls the spiritual or moral sig-
nificance of marriage. It will be apparent immediately that for many, per-
haps most, Americans, the answer is a church, synagogue, or similar reli-
gious institution with which they are affiliated.  These are nomic communi-
ties.  Not all are perhaps as thoroughgoing or apart from the world as the 
ones Cover scrutinized, but in matters of family morality, nevertheless, 
there they are.  Whether marriage is sanctified or a sacrament is determined 
by such communities.  In some religious traditions, restrictions on both 
marriage and divorce may be imposed apart from the territorial jurisdic-
tion’s civil rules, creating something of a dual structure to marriage for ad-
herents of those faiths.97   
The basic point, though, is that we need look no further than the 
church down the block for an example of an aterritorial response to “Where 
is same-sex marriage?” Different nomic communities differ in their re-
sponses to whether to recognize same-sex marriage.  We could identify 
strongly opposed religions such as Catholicism, the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints, Orthodox Judaism, and evangelical Protestantism. We 
could identify supportive religions, such as the Society of Friends, Unitar-
ian Universalism, the United Church of Christ, and the Reform and Recon-
structionist arms of American Judaism.  There is also the question of how to 
deal with differing viewpoints within any of these nomoi. We could identify 
denominations that are managing internal conflict relatively peacefully, so 
far—Lutherans, Presbyterians, the Conservative branch of American Juda-
ism.  We could identify those that are on the verge of sharp splits and per-
haps schism, certainly the American Episcopal Church,98 perhaps United 
Methodists.  The mechanisms of cultural dissent, in Madhavi Sunder’s 
term,99 are evident within these nomic communities, as all of them have to 
face the contemporary Kulturkampf, in one way or another. 
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Among the available strategies to manage conflict is exit, of course.100  
This could be the exit of a particular parish or diocese from a denomination 
altogether; but it could also be, and more commonly is, the exit of a particu-
lar member from one nomic community, perhaps to join another.  Typically, 
membership in such nomic communities does not depend on territorial loca-
tion of members.101 The aterritoriality of these nomoi is noteworthy.  It 
makes individual exit less costly, at least in terms of a physical move.102  We 
could look at whatever moral structure and spiritual blessing nomic com-
munities offer vis-à-vis marriage, as they variously define it, as competition 
in the provision of local public goods.  In contrast to Tiebout-type local 
public goods, these are nullibietous public goods.  They exist, but nowhere 
in specific; their benefits are not tied to the physical place of those who 
benefit from them.   
There are various proposals for disestablishing marriage – that is, 
eliminating civil marriage altogether, and concurrently allowing nomic 
communities to provide for the licitness of marriage variously on their own 
terms.103 (Presumably some kind of civil recognition of various kinds of 
households or partnership relationships would have to accompany disestab-
lishment of marriage, because our modern administrative state depends so 
heavily on the family form.) Proposals for disestablishment may be moti-
vated on the one hand by a libertarian suspicion of undue state interference 
in privately chosen social relations, or on the other by a typically liberal 
concern for separation of church and state.  My own contribution, perhaps, 
is to suggest that disestablishment also addresses some of the problems with 
exit costs when we assign the definition of marriage to territorial jurisdic-
tions.104 
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There is, however, a huge inherent downside to communities of mean-
ing that exist nowhere and everywhere.  They can be polluted, degraded, or 
desecrated from any quarter.  The problem is perhaps encapsulated in the 
well-known exchange in which a congressman said essentially “Well, I 
don’t think your same-sex marriage affects my marriage, but I know that it 
affects marriage generally, somehow.”105   
Here is my thumbnail sketch of the dynamics of the problem.  Because 
aterritorial nomoi rely for their connectedness on signification, they are 
likely to be vigilant about cultural signals and performances, which may 
come from anywhere.  This may be especially true when the ties that bind 
such a community take on universalizing and moralistic dimensions.  In 
terms of a distinction that Mary Anne Case has proposed in a work in pro-
gress, such communities are prone to “perfectionist” claims.106 For a perfec-
tionist, everyone must see and do things a certain way with regard to impor-
tant cultural and moral matters.  Such universal views leave no room for 
exit strategies at all.  Moreover, in an age of global media access, any of-
fensive law or performance anywhere in the world may be seen to threaten 
or pollute an aterritorial nomic community.  One gets responses to Law-
rence v. Texas107 from the other side of the world,108 and traditionalists cite 
the constitution of Afghanistan as an example of the universality and ur-
gency of defining marriage as between a man and a woman.109   
Indeed, if nomic communities are understood to be constituted primar-
ily in discursive space and only secondarily in places, then we can under-
stand how the threat of signal distortion, desecration, heresy, and pollution 
is an inherent possibility built into their structure.  When people identify 
themselves and one another, and reproduce their nomic communities in 
daily microperformances, in what they say and do (where what they do has 
communicative significance), then there will always be the possibility of 
transgressive communication and action.  Part of what will enable the 
community to persist over time is suppression, the policing, and elimination 
of unacceptable variation.  The preservation of the discursive space used by 
a nomic community will necessarily lead to battles over censorship, dese-
cration, transgressive performance, and the like.   
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C.  Where’s the Wedding?: Metonymy 
Asking the place/space question about same-sex marriage can be un-
derstood to include the question of where particular same-sex weddings 
occur.  One might need to know where the wedding is for purposes of lex 
loci celebrationis, which will help to determine whether the marriage is 
valid.  And of course, same-sex couples will plan weddings in locations that 
recognize same-sex marriage or some marriage substitute, thus entailing 
wedding tourism in addition to the occasional permanent relocation of such 
couples.110  
Issues around the location of the wedding can also involve conflicts 
over access to specific places that have special significance as discursive 
spaces.  Consider a current controversy in Ocean Grove, New Jersey.  
Ocean Grove is an interesting place, founded in 1869 as a United Methodist 
Camp Meeting and chartered by the state of New Jersey in 1870.111  Its ec-
clesiarchical government—a city governed by a corporate church-related 
organization—was overturned by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1979.112  
But the Camp Meeting Association continues to own the land and many 
public buildings, including specifically a beachfront Pavilion.113  Many 
weddings have been celebrated in this lovely location.  In the past couple of 
decades, though, the population of Ocean Grove changed, with many les-
bian and gay couples moving there.  After enactment of New Jersey’s civil 
union law in December 2006, two lesbian couples sought to book the Pavil-
ion for their civil union ceremonies.114  They were turned down, because the 
United Methodist Church does not recognize same-sex unions.115  The cou-
ples filed civil rights complaints with the state’s Division on Civil Rights 
under the state’s LAD, applied to the Pavilion as a public accommoda-
tion.116 The Camp Meeting Association retaliated with a federal lawsuit 
seeking an injunction on the basis that the state’s investigation violated 
various constitutional rights of the Camp Meeting Association.  In Novem-
ber 2007, the federal district court dismissed the Camp Meeting Associa-
tion’s complaint under the doctrine of Younger abstention.117  The state in-
vestigation is ongoing.118   
                                                    
 
110
 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 91. 
 
111
 Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82577 at *2 (Nov. 7, 2007). 
 
112
 State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1979). 
 
113
 Ocean Grove, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2. 
 
114
 Id. at *3. 
 
115
 Id. 
 
116
 Id. 
 
117
 Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82577 (Nov. 7, 2007) (applying Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). 
 
118
 For helpful short accounts of the controversy, see Jill P. Capuzzo, Civil Union Dispute Pits 
Methodist Retreat Against Gays Who Aided in Its Rebirth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007; Julia Vitullo-
 
2008] Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where is Same-Sex Marriage? 329 
The resolution of the Ocean Grove dispute may ultimately turn on 
whether the Pavilion is within the meaning of an exception in the LAD for 
real property owned by religious organizations.119  It may turn on whether 
the private status of the Pavilion has been waived by the Camp Meeting 
Association because it dedicated the Pavilion to public use, in practice (a 
kind of prescriptive publicness) and/or through repeated formal applications 
for tax exemptions that include the Pavilion as part of park-like space and 
that stated that the Pavilion was open to the public.  It might turn on 
whether exempting the Pavilion from the Law Against Discrimination con-
stitutes an establishment of religion; or whether refusing to exempt the Pa-
vilion constitutes an interference with the free exercise of religion.  The 
case might also turn ultimately on the application of the doctrine of expres-
sive association, as articulated in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.120 
Notable here is the mechanism of the controversy.  It is Kulturkampf 
played out in a particular physical place and discursive space, with a pri-
vately-owned building standing in for a strict Methodist nomic community, 
and a civil union ceremony standing in for the principle of same-sex mar-
riage,  challenging the nomic community’s restrictive approach to marriage.  
I will call this conflict an example of metonymy, metonymy being a rhe-
torical trope where one thing is used to stand in for another, related thing.121 
The Pavilion has become, because of its longstanding use in the community 
as a site for weddings, not only a place, but a contested discursive space in 
which the broader topic of marriage equality is addressed.    From the les-
bian couples’ viewpoint, especially in light of Lewis v. Harris,122 civil un-
ions are supposed to be just like marriages, and civil union ceremonies 
should be permitted to occur in any public places and spaces, any place of 
public accommodation.  Moreover, as a public place in which weddings 
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have routinely occurred and been visible to the local Ocean Grove commu-
nity, the Pavilion would be especially desirable, apt, and normalizing.   
In contrast, the Camp Meeting Association views the rental of the Pa-
vilion for a civil union ceremony as tantamount to an endorsement of civil 
unions.  Consequently, it views its exclusion of the couples from the Pavil-
ion place as expressive or religious.123   Whether the Camp Meeting Asso-
ciation is entitled to the religious real property exception, or is protected by 
some broader constitutional principle of free exercise, free speech, or ex-
pressive association,. the principle involved is hardly foreign to New Jersey 
law.  The exception in the LAD for religiously owned property explicitly 
recognizes the connection between religiously owned property and religious 
expression through exclusion in at least some circumstances.  
D. Microperformances of Married Status: The Traditional and the Trans-
gressive 
When couples appear in public —especially couples of about the same 
age, not related by blood, and especially when it is a man and a woman —
many people will make assumptions about whether they are emotionally 
and physically intimate—whether they are pair-bonded and coupling sexu-
ally.  They may want to know if they are married.  And they will look for 
clues and hints in the small interactions between the members of these cou-
ples.   
Sometimes others’ conclusions about relationship and status are mis-
taken. When I travel with my sister, we present as a family unit.  We are 
clearly long-term friends, intimate, and comfortable with one another. Peo-
ple almost always assume we are husband and wife.  
Nowadays, GLBT issues are salient enough to make the nature of 
same-sex couples’ microperformances a matter that most folks will notice 
and will admit to noticing. When a same-sex couple appears in public, of 
the same age more or less, and appears emotionally and perhaps physically 
close, people may not know quite what to think or do.  Are they homosex-
ual?  Are they physically intimate? Are they life partners?  Are they, per-
haps, even, legally married/united/partnered in the eyes of some territorial 
jurisdiction, husband and husband or wife and wife?  This may make a dif-
ference to those who observe such couples, in terms of how they assess the 
couple’s identity and how they interact with the couple and the couple in-
teracts with them.   
Marc Fajer noted some time ago that when two “real men” behave in 
public as intimate friends, people may well assume that they are gay and 
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sexually intimate.124 Fajer focuses on sexual orientation.  These days the 
couple’s relationship and status are also likely to be of interest.  In part, this 
is because knowing who is married is important to us, for all sorts of rea-
sons.  In a traditional view, the status of marriage sorts out licit relation-
ships, and ones in which sexual activity in particular is licit, from other less 
legitimate relationships and pursuits.125  The status of marriage also sorts 
out relationships that may produce legitimate children and that do produce 
other new kinship relationships.  It creates all sorts of benefits and obliga-
tions, as between the couple and as between one spouse and third parties.  
But how do we know when a couple that appears to be intimate is in fact 
married?  In addition to all the behavioral signs, we rely on the wedding 
band, perhaps especially, and the names and language they use to refer to 
one another (to each other and to third persons). All of these help us to sort 
out the nature of the relationship without ever asking to see the legal papers. 
The visible presence of an apparently intimate same-sex couple is like 
the mere presence of Mr. Dale in the Monmouth County Boy Scouts troop 
as an avowed homosexual, or of a GLBT group with an identifying banner 
in a St. Patrick’s Day parade.  It lays claim to the normal status that visible 
appearance as a married couple offers to different-sex couples.  At the same 
time, because appearance as a same-sex couple makes homosexuality visi-
ble without shame, it can be perceived by traditionalists as a transgressive 
appropriation of the status of a married couple (I mean to include here both 
legal status and whatever social acceptability comes with married couple 
status).  Thus, small, visible appearances as a married couple threaten to 
reconfigure social norms and categories.126   
Consider Shahar v. Bowers.127  In that case, a law student held herself 
out to be engaged, then married her female partner in a Jewish Reconstruc-
tionist ceremony.  They were not legally married, of course, as the states of 
Georgia (where she lived) and South Carolina (where the ceremony oc-
curred) did not permit it.  Nevertheless, her offer of employment with the 
state Attorney General’s office was withdrawn.   The Attorney General’s 
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reasons, which prevailed, were based on a government employer’s right to 
balance an employee’s behavior and continued employment, especially in a 
sensitive and public job such as law enforcement.  The Attorney General 
believed that the appearance of Shahar as married to another woman would 
create questions around conflicting interpretations of Georgia law, would 
affect the public credibility of the state’s interpretations of state law, would 
interfere with working relationships in the department, and that it indicated 
poor judgment on Ms. Shahar’s part.128   
I am not concerned for present purposes with the doctrinal reasons 
adopted in the majority or argued in the dissent.  What interests me here is 
why and how Ms. Shahar’s holding herself out as married was problematic.  
That it was problematic to the court is indicated from the very first footnote, 
in the very first sentence of the opinion.  There, the court distinguishes be-
tween Shahar’s religious marriage and wedding, which it puts in scare 
quotes, and marriage without scare quotes, which the court used “to indi-
cate legally recognized heterosexual marriage.”129  There is what Judge 
Godbold in dissent calls a “duality of meaning” around marriage.130   
Shahar held the duality of meaning about her marriage differently from 
the Attorney General.   She understood that she was married, but not legally 
married. “According to Shahar, though the State of Georgia does not recog-
nize her ‘marriage’ and she does not claim that the ‘marriage’ has legal ef-
fect, she and her partner consider themselves to be ‘married.’”131  
On legal forms, Shahar described herself as engaged.  She then par-
ticipated in a traditional (except for the same-sex part) Jewish Reconstruc-
tionist wedding before a congregation of 250 people in a public park.132  
The couple exchanged wedding bands—a permanent and visible symbol of 
marriage, as the court recognized explicitly.133  But her actions did not stop 
there.  The court catalogs several other ways in which Shahar “held herself 
out as ‘married.’”134 She and her partner changed their names so that they 
would have the same last name.  They obtained a married rate on insurance.  
They owned a house and cohabited in it.  As the court stresses, “these things 
were not done secretly, but openly.”135  The court concluded that “[e]ven if 
Shahar is not married to another woman, she, for appearance purposes, 
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might as well be.”136  Shahar “became—and remains for all to see— ‘mar-
ried.’”137 
Shahar argued to the court that her wedding and marriage occurred in a 
non-employment related context.138  Presumably then, they should not have 
mattered to her employer. We have seen this move before—an attempt to 
split discursive space.  The court—at least the majority—didn’t buy it.  It 
gave the employer great deference around the determination of how much 
Shahar’s performances of marriage would infringe on her effectiveness and 
the effectiveness of the office.  Just as in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,139 a 
GLBT individual was not allowed by the court to contain or limit the signif-
icance of her/his identity, once it had been publicly revealed. 
Judge Godbold’s dissent chastises the majority on this point.  In light 
of the “duality of meaning” of marriage, he says that the majority erred by 
adopting only one view.140  It should have realized that there was a non-
legal kind of marriage at issue in the case, a religiously-motivated view and 
practice, and should have required the Attorney General to investigate and 
balance that view and practice properly, instead of acting in ignorance of 
it.141 
Shahar’s problematic appearance of being married occurred against an 
increasingly vexed backdrop:  “ongoing controversy in Georgia about ho-
mosexual sodomy, homosexual relations, and other issues….”142 A footnote 
lists matters ongoing in Georgia state courts during the pendency of the 
Shahar litigation, including such issues as a gay father’s visitation rights, 
municipal authority under state law to register domestic partners, the rele-
vance of a former spouse being in a same-sex relationship to the other for-
mer spouse’s alimony, and whether group health insurance rates could be 
made available to domestic partners.143  Moreover, although the court does 
not mention it, surely many people would have been aware of the stir 
caused by the Hawaii same-sex marriage litigation and subsequent state 
constitutional amendment.  Both piecemeal and wholesale recognition of 
same-sex couples were in the air. 
Although Shahar’s wedding and marriage were undertaken with all 
sincerity within a recognized variant tradition of the Jewish faith, one could 
argue that they are still transgressive or parodic versions of marriage.  That 
is certainly how the Attorney General saw them, and how he thought that 
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the public would understand them.  Traditionalists might well understand 
Shahar’s performances of being married to undermine not only Shahar’s 
own credibility as an agent of the state, and the credibility of the office of 
the state Attorney General, but also the institution of marriage itself.  Gen-
erally speaking, when same-sex couples adopt the visible microperfor-
mances of being married, their intent might be mixed, as might be the ef-
fects of their actions.  In seeking to attain the normalizing status of mar-
riage, they perforce do marriage differently, and so their actions will tend to 
redefine it.  Whether visible microperformances of married status by same-
sex couples reaffirm or significantly undermine the underlying, traditional, 
gendered structure of the institution of marriage remains to be seen.   
To answer the question “Where is same-sex marriage?” as to microp-
erformances of married status, the signs and gestures of marriage can occur 
anywhere, from the wedding ring on a finger, to one woman calling the 
woman beside her her wife, to assertions of legal relationship in the emer-
gency room, to the presentation as a couple to the insurance agent or the 
travel agent, to simply living together and taking turns walking the dogs, 
and to putting out the recycling suffices.  The locations within daily life 
where marriage is performed and reaffirmed are myriad. So too are the 
places where same-sex couples, whether or not they have yet achieved the 
name and status of marriage, can shift social practice bit by bit.  
IV. CONCLUSION: ASKING THE PLACE/SPACE QUESTION WHERE IDENTITY 
PERFORMANCE IS CONCERNED 
When thinking about identity, especially identity as iterated perform-
ance, we sometimes overlook the importance of the places and spaces in 
which people must interact around identity.  Part III supra provides an ex-
ample of what happens when we “ask the place/space question”144 with re-
gard to same-sex marriage.   
As Katharine Bartlett has pointed out, “A question becomes a method 
when it is regularly asked.”145  Systematically asking the place/space ques-
tion could enrich the theory, doctrine, and practice around stigmatized iden-
tities.  
First, it might encourage us to turn more regularly to any of several 
disciplines that have sought to address the mechanisms of subordination in 
terms of identity performances in specific places and spaces.  For example, 
in a forthcoming symposium article, I draw on the dramaturgical approach 
to analyzing performances of the self from sociologist Erving Goffman, on 
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legal academic Kenji Yoshino’s account of identity performance, and on 
some of the writings of philosopher and cultural critic Judith Butler, explor-
ing how their insights apply to disputes over the visibility of same-sex cou-
ples.146  Generally speaking, “Without an understanding of sociological is-
sues of belonging, recognition and solidarity we cannot adequately address 
the political issues of status, rights and equality.”147   One theoretical and 
doctrinal consequence of developing a method of asking the place/space 
question relating to identity might be a fuller development of what Nan 
Hunter has called the matter of expressive identity.148  While conflicts about 
GLBTQ visibility are sometimes framed doctrinally in terms of tradition-
ally protected First Amendment speech or conduct,149 this approach is often 
somewhat of a tangent to important controversies, for it does not quite get 
at the way in which visibility without shame, in specific places and spaces, 
is the underlying contested issue.  Legal scholars have touched on this mat-
ter from various angles,150 but the approach does not seem particularly well 
developed at this time.  A focus on the place/space aspects of identity and 
visibility could help to understand better and perhaps to reformulate doctri-
nally a series of important cases about the compelled sharing of places and 
spaces where identity is at issue.151 It might also serve to develop a differen-
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tiated theory of claims of a right to appearance, based on the identity at 
stake and the specific place or space within which the right is asserted.152   
Asking the place/space question systematically might also serve to 
bridge the gap between broad discussions of “full citizenship” and an array 
of more focused doctrines that mediate between specific practices of exclu-
sion and broad claims of citizenship.153  By way of introductory back-
ground, for perhaps a couple of decades now, various debates about politics, 
human rights, political participation, and identity have been phrased in 
terms of “citizenship.”154  The term is used in many ways, with little uni-
formity. Linda Bosniak has called citizenship “a very chaotic field.”155  
Brenda Cossman, writing specifically about sexual citizenship, agrees that 
there is little uniformity in the usage.156  Both authorities, however, describe 
a fourfold taxonomy of meanings of “citizenship”:  citizenship as legal 
status; citizenship as access to political, social and civil rights; citizenship 
as participation in political processes; and citizenship as individual and 
group identity.157   
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Bosniak and Cossman agree that all these types of usages have in 
common some concept of “membership.”158  But the superordinate concept 
of “equal citizenship” as membership or inclusion often requires a kind of 
step-down transformation into more specific doctrines and categories in 
order to address particular controversies involving particular individuals, 
even though these are also about citizenship. As Cossman writes, citizen-
ship “invok[es] the ways that different subjects are constituted as members 
of a polity, the ways they are, or are not, granted rights, responsibilities, and 
representations within that polity, as well as acknowledgement and inclu-
sion through a multiplicity of legal, political, cultural, and social dis-
courses.”
159
  The citizenship claim is both general and specific at the same 
time. Carl Stychin agrees. “Citizenship is frequently grounded in a norma-
tive discourse of ‘civic inclusion,’ and citizenship provides the framework 
within which to make many legal claims.”160   
  Marriage is one such practice of citizenship,161 and the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from the institution of marriage does create an experience 
of second-class status.162  Asking the place/space question about same-sex 
marriage, as I have done in this essay, illuminates specific and intersecting 
levels of the marriage controversy.  Exclusion from marriage is, however, 
only one of many kinds of exclusion that GLBTQ folk face.  If a general 
sense of membership is the overarching issue raised by invoking “citizen-
ship”, we must also talk about exclusion of GLBTQ folk from many public 
and private institutions in addition to marriage: the military, adoption and 
foster parenting (in a few states), hate crime protection (in some states), 
protection from discrimination in employment, housing, and public ac-
commodations (in many states and in federal law), visibility in public sex 
education (in many states),  AIDS health care and education work (to some 
extent, in some states), parades public and private (in some places), private 
civic institutions (notably the Boy Scouts), the wedding announcements on 
the society page, many religious institutions, and (in some places) the prom.  
Exclusion from these institutions creates a sense of inequality, degradation, 
                                                    
problematic distinction between foreigners and nationals, in this passage and elsewhere in her book, 
relies on the first. 
 
158
 BOSNIAK, The Citizen and the Alien,  supra note 157, at 18; COSSMAN, supra note 156, at  5. 
 
159
 COSSMAN, supra note 156, at 5. 
 
160
 CARL F. STYCHIN, GOVERNING SEXUALITY: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF SEXUALITY AND LAW 
REFORM 7 (2003). 
 
161
 See, e.g., Angela Harris, Loving Before and After the Law, 76 FORDHAM  L. REV. 2861, 2861 
(2008) (applying Bosniak’s fourfold taxonomy of citizenship to marriage). 
 
162
 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008); In re 
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570, 571 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Depart-
ment of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d  941, 948 ( Mass. 2003); David S. Buckel, Lewis v. Harris: A Settled 
Question and an Open Question, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 221, 228-29 (2007); Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex 
Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL. & L. 291, 338 (2001). 
338 FIU Law Review [3:307 
and outside status.163  Access to all these desirable institutions would, in 
various ways, confer a sense of belonging. 
In terms of developing legal challenges to exclusions, doctrinally we 
can generate quite a long list of general, sometimes truly vague terms we 
might invoke to address citizenship or membership.164  Some are specifi-
cally in the federal constitutional—liberty, property, due process, equal pro-
tection, privileges and immunities (federal and state varieties).  At least one 
more is somewhere in there sort of—privacy.  Perhaps the term “citizen-
ship” itself has some independent clout.165  Other terms not literally written 
in the United States constitution are certainly understood to be at issue and 
perhaps can be found in other (state or foreign) constitutions—dignity, re-
spect, belonging, membership, removal of stigma, anti-caste, antisubordina-
tion.  In addition we have available many more specific doctrines: anti-
discrimination laws applied in public accommodations, employment and 
housing contexts; disability law; rights of appearance; language rights; First 
Amendment doctrines in various contexts; election law; education law; 
labor law; zoning and land use disputes, in some contexts;166 in some con-
texts antitrust; even perhaps the public trust doctrine.167 
We can use the place/space question to develop a tiered description of 
the praxis of challenging various exclusions that create and maintain a 
sense of second-class citizenship.  Transgressive presence or visibility vio-
lates an exclusion in a specific context and at a specific place and space.  
One or more of a number of legal doctrines can then be mobilized to chal-
lenge the specific practice of exclusion.  Behind the specific practice of 
exclusion and the potential doctrinal challenge there lies a generalized con-
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cept of membership and citizenship, which often informs our intuition of 
injustice and unfairness.  An effective argument to a judge (or to the legisla-
ture, or in the court of public opinion) for rejecting specific practices of 
exclusion can thus be understood to occur on three levels simultaneously: 
place/space, doctrine, and citizenship/membership.   
Social and legal shifts in smaller and more specific practices of exclu-
sion sometimes merge together to create a stronger sense of full citizenship 
and participation in a wide range of societal institutions.  I discussed this 
process in terms of piecemeal and wholesale approaches to marriage equal-
ity in a recent article.168 Citizenship arguments extrapolate from specific 
legal changes invalidating specific practices of exclusion into a broader 
theory of change, moving towards equal citizenship.169 
Kenneth Karst, quoting Helen Merrell Lynd, writes “Some kind of an-
swer to the question Where do I belong? is necessary for an answer to the 
question Who am I?”170 I take his point literally, at least in part. Methodi-
cally asking the place/space question around issues of stigmatized identity 
offers several advantages.  It encourages us to explore potentially fruitful 
interdisciplinary synergies to develop a better account of ongoing processes 
that stigmatize and subordinate certain identities.  It encourages develop-
ment of a better doctrinal account of the problem of expressive identity. 
And it can provide a better theory for the praxis of challenging stigmatized 
identities through specific acts of transgressive presence and visibility, and 
a perhaps a better explanation of how piecemeal legal victories can lead to 
wholesale ones. 
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